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CAN STUDENTS DO WHAT THE STATE
CANNOT DO?: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STUDENT INITIATED, SPONSORED,
COMPOSED AND DELIVERED PRAYERS AT
GRADUATION
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the "religion" clauses of the United States Con-
stitution seem contradictory.' The Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws that facilitate
an establishment of religion.2 The Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, in contrast, provides that Congress shall make
no law "prohibiting the free exercise of religion."3 The apparent
conflict between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause has inflamed the passions and emotions of the American
people in the educational arena.4 An area that has tested the flexi-
I See Jonathon C. Drimmer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Duty of Public Schools to
Limit Student Proposed Graduation Prayers, 74 NEB. L. REv. 411, 416 (1995) (describing
Free Exercise Clause as Establishment Clause's antithetical twin which erodes metaphori-
cal wall); see also Paul L. Hicks, The Wall Crumbles: A Look at the Establishment Clause
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 363, 364
(1995) (acknowledging that Rosenberger court tore down wall of separation between church
and state while recognizing conflict between Free Speech Clause and Establishment
Clause).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion.. ."); see also Drimmer, supra note 1, at 415 (detailing
meaning of Anti-Establishment Clause); Martha M. McCarthy, Free Speech Versus Anti-
Establishment: Is There a Hierarchy of First Amendment Rights?, 108 EDuc. L. REP. 475,
475 (1996) (discussing Establishment Clause in light of Free Exercise Clause); Michelle
DiGrazia, Note, Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist.: Graduates Will We Stand and Join in
Prayer?, 23 PAc. L.J. 1449, 1449 (1992) (stating principles of Establishment Clause); The-
resa M. Serra, Note, Invocations and Benedictions: Is the Supreme Court "Graduating" to a
Marsh Analysis?, 65 U. DET. L. REv. 769, 769 (1988) (discussing Establishment Clause
principles).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . ."; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591-92
(1992) (discussing Free Exercise Clause as protection of religion expression); Kevin E.
Broyles, Establishment of Religion and High School Graduation Ceremonies: Lee v. Weis-
man, 16 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 279, 279 (1993) (demonstrating that First Amendment
contains religion clauses including Free Exercise Clause which prohibits laws that inter-
fere with religious expression); McCarthy, supra note 2, at 475 (discussing Free Exercise
Clause of Constitution); Serra, supra note 2, at 769 (defining Free Exercise Clause as
means to secure religious liberty).
4 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (striking down state aid for
secular subjects taught in Catholic schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (hold-
ing that required recitation of daily prayers in schools was unconstitutional); McCollum v.
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bility of this conflict is the inclusion of student sponsored prayers
at graduation ceremonies. 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman6 stated that
the inclusion of a nonsectarian prayer by a clergyman in an official
graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause.7 Ini-
tially, this was viewed as a resolution to the issue of whether
prayers at graduation ceremonies should be permitted in public
schools.8 The effect of the Lee decision, however, was short-lived
because the Court failed to address the constitutionality of stu-
dent sponsored, composed and delivered prayers at graduation
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (striking down religious instruction on public school
grounds); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930) (reasoning that
loaning secular textbooks to students in parochial schools was constitutional); Pierce v.
Society of Sister, 268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925) (ruling that parents have right to send children
to religiously supported schools). See generally John R. Vile, Religious Expression in High
School Valedictory Addresses: Guidy v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 53 EDUCATION L. REP.
1051, 1052 (1989) (discussing cases involving religious expression in schools).
5 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 595 (premising that high school graduations are integral part of
American culture); see also American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l, 84
F.3d 1471, 1488 (3d Cir. 1996) (declaring student vote to include prayers in graduation
unconstitutional); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 459 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating
student sponsored prayers at graduation); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Schs., 977 F.2d 963,
972 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding student initiated and organized prayer in graduation cere-
mony); Gearon v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 844 F.Supp. 1097, 1102 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding
student sponsored graduation prayers unconstitutional); David Schimmel, Graduation
Prayers Flunk Coercion Test: An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 76 EDuc. L. REP. 913, 917
(1992) (stating that graduation's nature requires student attendance); Amy Louise Wein-
haus, The Fate of Graduation Prayers in Public School After Lee v. Weisman, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 957, 974 (1993) (contending that graduation is so important that its attendance is
obligatory).
6 505 U.S. 577 (1992). See Broyles, supra note 3, at 279 (categorizing Lee as decision that
decided issue of graduation prayers); Drimmer, supra note 1, at 427-29 (discussing Lee case
that held graduation prayers unconstitutional); Norma R. Rankin and John L. Strope, Jr.,
Prayer at Public School Graduation: What is a School Official to Do?, 89 EDUC. L. REP.
1051, 1051-59 (1994) (discussing Lee as Supreme Court decision striking down only bene-
diction portion of graduation ceremony); Thomas A. Schweitzer, The Progeny of Lee v.
Weisman: Can Student-initiated Prayer at Public School Graduations Still be Constitu-
tional?, 9 BYU J. PuB. L. 291, 291-93 (1995) (discussing Lee involving issue of constitution-
ality of graduation prayers in public schools); Rick A. Swanson, Time for Change: Analyz-
ing Graduation Invocations and Benedictions Under Religiously Neutral Principles of the
Public Forum, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1405, 1406-08 (1996) (discussing Lee case that involved
invited clergy delivering prayer at graduation ceremony).
7 Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
8 See id.; see also Broyles, supra note 3, at 279 (explaining how Lee initially resolved
issue of graduation prayers yet only resolved issue to extent that school official invites cler-
gyman to deliver prayers); Drimmer, supra note 1, at 427-29 (stating that Lee decision may
not be applicable to cases of student sponsored graduation prayers); Weinhaus, supra note
5, at 957 (inferring that Lee's resolution of constitutionality did not last long); Perry A.
Zirkel, Graduation Invocations and Benedictions: Good Faith Interpretation, 89 EDUC. L.
REP. 1061, 1064-66 (1994) (asserting that Lee's holding may not be binding in cases where
officials did not make the decisions on whether to include prayers in graduation ceremonies
and who should deliver such prayers).
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ceremonies. 9 School officials have, as a result, circumvented the
fact specific ruling of Lee by allowing the student body to decide
whether to include prayer in their graduation ceremonies. 10 The
sponsored prayer issue has thus resulted in a split among the fed-
eral circuit courts."
This Note asserts that student sponsored, composed and deliv-
ered prayers during graduation ceremonies in public schools are
constitutional. Part I of this Note analyzes the principles and pur-
poses of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, including
the various standards courts have utilize to determine when the
Establishment Clause has been violated by governmental action.
Part II discusses the conflict in lower court decisions that has re-
sulted in different rulings in different circuits. Part III addresses
these rulings and how they should have upheld the constitutional-
ity of student sponsored prayers. An argument will be presented
that the decisions of the lower courts are inconsistent with the
principles and purposes of the Establishment Clause. Finally,
this Note concludes that student sponsored prayers meet the
threshold of constitutionality required under the most recent judi-
cial standards.
9 See Drimmer, supra note 1, at 412 (stating that courts began to find distinction with
student sponsored graduation prayers after Lee); Rankin & Strope, supra note 6, at 1051
(contending Lee led to confusion as to whether all forms of graduation prayers are unconsti-
tutional); Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 292 (stating that Lee narrowly tailored decision to
facts of case); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 957 (reasoning that Lee only answered question of
member of clergy delivering prayer at graduation); Zirkel, supra note 8, at 1066 (asserting
that Lee narrowed its decision to specific facts of case).
10 See, e.g., Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1488 (striking down policy that allowed student
vote to determine inclusion of graduation prayer unconstitutional); Harris, 41 F.3d at 459
(inclusion of student sponsored prayers in graduation ceremony was unconstitutional);
Jones, 977 F.2d at 972 (upholding constitutionality of student initiated, organized prayers
at graduation); Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1102 (declaring student sponsored graduation
prayers as unconstitutional); see also McCarthy, supra note 2, at 481 (describing that
school officials found creative ways to return prayers to graduation in response to Lee);
Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 979 (asserting Lee's narrow decision left open possibility of
student selection of graduation prayers); Philip Oliss, Case Note, Praise the Lord and Pass
the Diplomas: Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 705, 706 (1994) (discussing case
where school attempted to circumvent Lee with inclusion of student sponsored graduation
prayers).
11 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1488. The Third Circuit struck down school policies
that allowed the graduating senior class to determine whether to include prayers at their
graduation ceremony because such inclusion violated the Establishment Clause. Id.; see
also Harris, 41 F.3d at 459. The Ninth Circuit also struck down the use of student spon-
sored and voted prayers included at graduation. Id. But see Jones, 977 F.3d at 972. The
Fifth Circuit, however, held that student sponsored prayers were not violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause and therefore were constitutional. Id.
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I. PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
AND THE STANDARDS EMPLOYED TO DETERMINE
VIOLATION
The colonists fled to America searching for political and reli-
gious freedom. 12 The religion clauses of the First Amendment re-
flected the colonists' fear of governmental intervention in
religion."'
The Establishment Clause which created a "wall" separating
religion and government addressed the colonists fears.' 4 The Es-
tablishment Clause, however, has a constitutional counterpart
that created confusion under First Amendment jurisprudence.' 5
The Free Exercise Clause breaks down the "wall" created by the
Establishment Clause which safeguards an individual's religious
practices from governmental interference.
16
The courts, when confronted with the issue of religion in public
schools, have required that the government be substantively neu-
12 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 (asserting that Framers believed religious expression was too
personal to be prescribed by government); see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-
9 (1947) (noting reason why settlers came to America was to avoid religious conflicts in
England); Serra, supra note 2, at 769 (detailing that early settlers came to America to avoid
church-state conflicts in England).
13 See Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 821 (Cal. 1991) (reasoning that
Constitution mandates government remaining secular rather than affiliating with religious
beliefs); Drimmer, supra note 1, at 421 (describing purpose of Bill of Rights was to with-
draw certain subjects from political controversy); Vile, supra note 4, at 1054 (describing
desirability of separation of church-state as concept reflected in Establishment Clause);
Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 958 (contending that in order to end lingering doubt that Con-
stitution did not adequately protect religious freedom, drafters included Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses).
14 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptists, Jan 1, 1802, in 16 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAs JEFFERSON 281, 282 (1861) (using metaphoric term "wall" to describe sepa-
ration between church and government); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (describing Estab-
lishment Clause utilizing Jefferson's "wall" metaphor); Drimmer, supra note 1, at 421
(stating Jefferson's metaphorical description of Establishment Clause as "wall" that sepa-
rates religious activities from governmental endorsement); McCarthy, supra note 2, at 475
(discussing Jeffersonian metaphor of "wall" separating church and state).
15 See Drimmer, supra note 1, at 416 (stating that Free Exercise Clause is antithetical
twin that eroded protection provided by Establishment Clause). See generally Broyles,
supra note 3, at 279 (asserting there is controversy and confusion about relationship be-
tween Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 958
(asserting there is conflict between two religion clauses); Serra, supra note 2, at 770 (con-
tending there is obvious tension between two clauses).
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing right to exercise religion free from govern-
mental interference); see also Broyles, supra note 3, at 279 (speaking of Free Exercise
Clause as mandate that prohibits laws that interfere with religious expression); Drimmer,
supra note 1, at 416 (asserting that Free Exercise Clause allows Congress to remove other-
wise neutral laws that unduly burden individual's free exercise of religion).
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tral.17 Presumably, this ensures that mandatory state sponsored
school events do not contain a level of religiosity amounting to in-
doctrination.' 8 Although the courts abide by this principle, they
have allowed the intermingling of religion and education in cases
regarding voluntary school events, reasoning that the risk of in-
doctrination is very low. 19 Courts have reasoned that the element
of coercion is absent from voluntary events, since a student may
choose not to attend if she believes that her beliefs would be in-
fringed upon in some manner.2 °
A. Standards Employed to Determine Establishment Clause
Violations
Over the years, the Supreme Court has established various
tests and standards to determine whether state action violated
17 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (asserting that religion clauses require that religious beliefs
can not be either proscribed or preserved by government); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1951) (asserting that formal neutrality prohibits state from encouraging or restricting
religion and religious practices); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 387 (1985) (stating that
substantive neutrality requires state to act affirmatively to ensure that religion is not en-
couraged); Drimmer, supra note 1, at 419 (stating neutrality principle is composed of for-
mal neutrality and substantive neutrality); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L.
REV. 226, 313-316 (1987) (stating that subtle contradiction between Establishment Clause
and Free Exercise Clause has resulted in principal and practice of governmental neutral-
ity); E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1183, 1204-1204 (1994) (contending that governmental neutrality prohibits government
from undertaking or discussing religious practices).
18 See Ball, 473 U.S. at 387 (asserting that state official must prevent religious indoctri-
nation in schools); Drimmer, supra note 1, at 420 (asserting that neutrality principle re-
quires state to ensure that state supported activity in school is free from religious
indoctrination).
19 See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 306 (permitting religious instruction for public school children
on school grounds); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (upholding state aid to
transport students to religious schools); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971) (recognizing that complete separation of church and state is impossible); Vile, supra
note 4, at 1052 (listing cases where court has allowed religious activities in public schools).
See generally Drimmer, supra note 1, at 416 (asserting that intermingling of government
and religion is inevitable).
20 See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962) (stating that voluntary events may in-
clude prayers because students can choose whether to attend). See generally Timothy S.
Eckley, Invoking the Presence of God at Public High School Graduation Ceremonies: Gra-
ham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 71 IOWA L. REV. 1247, 1252 (1986) (discussing courts
permitting religion in voluntary school events); Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo,
High School Prayers at Graduation: Will the Court Pronounce the Benedictions?, 69 EDUC.
L. REP. 189, 194 (1991) (discussing court cases where voluntary school events included
religious expression); Vile, supra note 4, at 1052 (detailing cases where inclusion of reli-
gious expression in voluntary school events was constitutional); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at
960-62 (discussing constitutionality of inclusion of religion in school sponsored voluntary
events).
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the Establishment Clause. 2 ' In Lemon v. Kurtzman,22  the
Supreme Court established a three prong test to evaluate any Es-
tablishment Clause challenge.23 This test provides that, in order
to pass judicial scrutiny, the questioned practice must: (i) have a
secular purpose; (ii) neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (iii)
not result in excessive entanglement of government and religion.2 4
Nevertheless, the courts soon became dissatisfied with the Lemon
test and began to look for a new standard to determine violations
of the Establishment Clause.25
In response to the dissatisfaction with this test,26 standards
such as the "accommodation" standard27 and the "endorsement"
standard28 were developed and found to be equally inadequate.2 9
21 See Eckley, supra note 20, at 1247-70 (detailing Lemon test in Establishment Clause
cases); Christian M. Keiner, A Critical Analysis of Continuing Establishment Clause Flux
as Illustrated by Lee v. Weisman and Graduation Prayers, 24 PAC. L.J. 401, 408-17 (1993)
(reviewing Establishment Clause standards formulated by Supreme Court); Weinhaus,
supra note 5, at 957-969 (discussing principles governing Establishment Clause); DiGrazia,
supra note 2, at 1452-64 (listing various tests utilized by Supreme Court in Establishment
Clause violations); Serra, supra note 2, at 774-86 (explaining different tests developed by
Supreme Court to deal with Establishment Clause cases).
22 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23 Id. at 612-613. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584-85 (1992) (discussing Lemon's
establishment of three prong test to be used in Establishment Clause cases); see also
Keiner, supra note 21, at 408-417 (explaining that Supreme Court established three prong
Lemon test to determine Establishment Clause violations). See generally Eckley, supra
note 20, at 1247 (detailing Lemon test which established three prong test to determine
Establishment Clause violations); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 957 (discussing Lemon case
which struck down state aid to religious schools); Serra, supra note 2, at 774 (discussing
Lemon case which involved state aid to religious schools).
24 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (utilizing test to strike down state aid that was made
available to secular subjects taught in private Catholic schools); see also Adler v. Duval
County Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 451-456 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (discussing test developed in
Lemon); Keiner, supra note 21, at 408-17 (analyzing Lemon test requirements for Estab-
lishment Clause issues); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 957 (detailing three prong Lemon Test
to determine Establishment Clause violations).
25 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 587-594 (1992) (establishing psychological coercion test
to determine Establishment Clause violations while ignoring Lemon test); Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lemon test
must be modified in order to be operable); Marsh v. Chamers, 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983)
(utilizing historical based rationale to determine Establishment Clause violations); Eckley,
supra note 20, at 1247 (noting lower courts utilizing tests other than Lemon test to deter-
mine Establishment Clause violations).
26 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-692 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (proposing modification as
only way Lemon test can be workable); see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (stating dissatisfaction with Lemon test in its original form in addition to pro-
posing modification of Lemon test).
27 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783 (establishing standard that utilizes historical based ratio-
nales to answer question of whether specific governmental action fosters preference of one
religious sect over another or establishes national religion or church); see also Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-107 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (utilizing historical analysis
instead of Lemon test to discount absolutist "wall" metaphor).
28 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (modifying Lemon test to
focus on determining "whether the state activity endorses or approves of religion and
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As a result of the various tests created by the Supreme Court,
lower courts have been in a quandry as to which test to utilize
when determining Establishment Clause violations.30
B. The Psychological Coercion Test: Lee v. Weisman and the
Creation of an Additional Test to Determine
Establishment Clause Violations
The Supreme Court added to the confusion of the various tests
by establishing the psychological coercion test to determine Estab-
lishment Clause violations. In Lee v. Weisman,3' the principal of
Nathan Bishop Middle School invited a rabbi to deliver a prayer
at the graduation ceremony.32 The parent of a graduate objected
and brought suit to enjoin the school from including the prayer in
the commencement exercises.33 The Supreme Court held that a
clergyman delivering prayers as part of an official graduation cer-
emony violated the Establishment Clause. 4 The Lee Court ig-
nored the Lemon test and adopted a new standard called the "psy-
chological coercion test" which asks whether the prayers carried a
whether the activity sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, while send-
ing a message to adherents that they are insiders and favored members of the political
community"); see also Cheryl A. Hance, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univer-
sity of Virginia: Will the Real Establishment Clause Test Stand Up?, 5 WID. J. PUB. L. 549,
552 (1992) (describing focus of Establishment Clause pursuant to endorsement test as
whether government endorses religious activity); Ellen Quinn Johnson, School Prayer and
the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48 MD. L. REv. 1018, 1044 (1989) (describing focus of
Establishment Clause violation inquiry as degree of governmental endorsement).
29 See generally American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d 1471, 1488
(3d. Cir. 1996) (utilizing only Lemon test and psychological coercion test to strike down
student sponsored graduation prayers); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 459 (9th
Cir. 1994) (applying Lemon test and Lee's psychological coercion test to hold that student
sponsored graduation prayers are unconstitutional); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch., 977
F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding constitutionality of student initiated prayers by
using psychological coercion test and Lemon test).
30 See Eckley, supra note 20, at 1247 (stating that lower courts have utilized different
tests to determine Establishment Clause violations); Keiner, supra note 21, at 408-17 (not-
ing various Establishment Clause tests utilized); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 957-69 (ana-
lyzing standards governing Establishment Clause violations); DiGrazia, supra note 2, at
1452-64 (discussing various tests Supreme Court developed to determine Establishment
Clause violations); Serra, supra note 2, at 774-86 (explaining that confusion of various tests
led to lower courts use of different tests to determine violations of Establishment Clause).
31 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
32 See id. at 581. "The guidelines recommend that public prayers at nonsectarian cere-
monies be composed with inclusiveness and sensitivity." Id. Yet, they acknowledge that
prayer of any kind may be inappropriate on some civic occasions. Id. The invited Rabbi was
given a set of guidelines to ensure that prayer would be secular. Id.
33 See id. at 581.
34 See id. at 577.
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particular risk of indirect coercion.35 The psychological coercion
test is premised on the Court's presumption that when a school
official includes prayer in a graduation ceremony, it manifests a
"subtle coercive pressure" compelling the students to participate
despite their objections.2 6 Although attendance at graduation is
considered voluntary, the Court reasoned that the significance of
the ceremony in one's life created an inherent obligatory attend-
ance, thereby creating a high risk of coercion.
As a result, Lee narrowly resolved the issue of the constitution-
ality of graduation prayers in the context of state officials "di-
rect[ing] the performance of formal religious exercise for secon-
dary schools." 38 The majority in Lee stated that the "dominant
facts" of this case restrict and control the implications of the
Court's decision.3 9 Lee's fact sensitive analysis prompted school of-
ficials and students to circumvent the decision.40 Thus, by al-
lowing graduating students to propose, sponsor, compose and de-
35 See id. at 587-94. See generally Broyles, supra note 3, at 280-83 (stating that Justice
Kennedy discussed need to reconsider Lemon test); Drimmer, supra note 1, at 428 (discuss-
ing Court's unexplained avoidance of Lemon in developing new test).
36 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 589-93; see also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Educ., 851 F. Supp.
446, 456 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (allowing any type of prayer at graduation ceremonies was un-
constitutional because of psychological pressure placed on students); Eric Fleetham, Lee v.
Weisman: Psychological Coercion Offends the Traditional Notions of Coercion under the
Establishment Clause, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 725, 743 (1993) (considering accommodation of
prayer as "subtle coercive pressure").
37 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 595; see also Albright v. Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765
F. Supp. 682, 686 (D. Utah 1991) (describing high school graduation as unique); Steven G.
Gey, Religions Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 503 (1994)
(discussing special nature of high school graduation ceremonies because it marks begin-
ning of adulthood); Christina Engstrom Martin, Student-Initiated Religious Expression Af-
ter Mergens and Weisman, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1565, 1579 (1994) (explaining that student
attendance at graduation is obligatory because students worked hard to graduate and few
would want to miss it).
38 Lee, 505 U.S. at 586. See generally Schimmel, supra note 5, at 928-929 (explaining
that Lee decision is confined to its facts); Oliss, supra note 10, at 705 (stating that Lee left
questions concerning graduation prayers unanswered because of Lee's specific facts).
39 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586; see also Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 974 (explaining that Lee's
decision was confined to its facts). See generally Schimmel, supra note 5, at 928-29 (stating
that it is unclear whether Lee holding will offset future Establishment Clause cases); Oliss,
supra note 10, at 705 (describing Lee ruling as limited to facts of school officials inviting
clergy to deliver nonsectarian prayer at high school graduation).
40 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d 1471, 1471 (3d Cir.
1996) (involving school policy allowing students to vote on whether to include prayer in
graduation ceremony in light of Lee decision); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 447
(9th Cir. 1994) (involving school officials granting students' authority to decide whether to
include prayer in graduation); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Schs., 977 F.2d 963, 963 (5th
Cir. 1992) (discussing school policy allowing student initiated-organized prayer in gradua-
tion ceremony); Gearon v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(analyzing whether student sponsored prayers included in graduation ceremonies were
constitutional).
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liver these prayers at their graduation ceremonies, "the dominant
facts" of Lee have been avoided. 4' Such actions have led to litiga-
tion concerning the constitutionality of student sponsored prayers
at commencement exercises.42
II. LOWER COURT DECISIONS THAT HAvE DETERMINED WHETHER
STUDENT SPONSORED PRAYERS AT GRADUATION ARE
VIOLATIVE OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Since the Supreme Court in Lee failed to determine whether all
forms of graduation prayers are constitutional, the lower courts
have tackled this issue and have come to differing conclusions. In
American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd.,4
the Board of Education was faced with the task of changing their
traditional practice of permitting members of the clergy to deliver
nonsectarian invocations and benedictions during the graduation
ceremonies of local schools.' The Board formulated two alterna-
tive proposals to allow some form of prayer in the ceremony.45 The
senior class decided to include prayer at the commencement exer-
cises and the student officers selected a graduating student to de-
liver the prayer.46 The Third Circuit struck down the student
sponsored and delivered prayer as unconstitutional, finding that
the Board's decision to allow a student vote to determine the inclu-
41 See generally Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 980 (analyzing cases involving student spon-
sored prayers at graduation); Oliss, supra note 10, at 706-07 (providing cases where stu-
dent officials have allowed students to decide whether to include prayers at graduation).
42 See, e.g., Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1471 (concerning determination of constitution-
ality of student sponsored prayers in graduation ceremonies); Harris, 41 F.3d at 447 (deter-
mining whether student sponsored graduation prayers violate Establishment Clause);
Jones, 977 F.2d at 963 (noting constitutionality of student sponsored prayers in graduation
ceremony); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Educ., 851 F. Supp. 446, 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (dis-
cussing constitutionality of student initiated prayers); Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1097 (ana-
lyzing Establishment Clause implications of student sponsored prayer); Graham v. Central
Community Dist. of Decantur County, 608 F. Supp. 531, 537 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (deciding
constitutionality of student sponsored prayers).
43 84 F.3d 1471, 1488 (3d Cir. 1996).
44 See id. at 1474-75. See generally Rankin & Strope, supra note 6, at 1059 (discussing
facts leading to Board's decision to allow student vote to determine inclusion of prayer at
graduation); Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 300 (stating that Board permitted students to
vote on whether prayer should be delivered because of Lee).
45 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1474-75. The first proposal permitted the graduating
class to decide, by plurality vote, whether to include prayers in their graduation ceremony.
Id. The alternative proposal did not allow prayers but would give the students and audi-
ence an opportunity to silently reflect on the graduation event. Id. The Board of Education
unanimously adopted the former proposal entitled "Religion at Graduation Exercises." Id.
46 See id. The resulting vote was 128 votes for prayer, 120 for reflection or moment of
silence and 20 votes for neither prayer or reflection. Id.
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sion of prayers was a form of Board control over the ceremony's
religious content.4 7 Thus, the court found little meaningful dis-
tinction between the coercion present in Lee and that under the
facts of Black Horse Pike.48
In Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist.,9 the school district delegated the
decision making power of every aspect of the graduation ceremony
to the students.5 0 These decisions included whether to include
prayer in the ceremony, and if they decided to include prayer, the
decision as to who would deliver the prayer.5 ' In addition to the
district's long standing practice of including graduation prayer,
the board of trustees included a disclaimer in the ceremonies stat-
ing that it did not endorse any statement made by anyone at the
ceremony." The Ninth. Circuit held these actions violative of the
Establishment Clause.5
3
The Harris majority reasoned that although the students de-
cided the contents of the ceremony, the school officials controlled
the event.54 The court reasoned that while the ultimate decision
47 See id. at 1476-78. The ACLU filed a complaint requesting that the prayers be en-
joined from inclusion at graduation. Id.; see also Rankin & Strope, supra note 6, at 1059.
The district court denied their request and held that student prayers were permitted be-
cause they did not present a high risk of coercion, which Lee prohibited. Id.; Schweitzer,
supra note 6, at 300. The district court's decision was reversed by the court of appeals and
the Board was enjoined from allowing the student sponsored prayer at the graduation cere-
mony. Id.
48 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1480 (noting that Lee was indistinguishable despite
issue of control since final decision vested with state actor).
49 Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2604
(1995), vacated, 62 F.3d 1233 (1995). A graduate's parent brought suit against the school
in the United States District Court to enjoin the prayers from being included in the cere-
mony. Id. The district court deferred its decision until the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Lee v. Weisman. Id. at 453. After the Supreme Court decided Lee, the district court
denied the plaintiffs petition and held that student sponsored prayers did not violate the
Establishment Clause. Id. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit of the Court of Ap-
peals, which reversed the district courts decision. Id.
50 See id. at 452.
51 See id. at 452-53. The school district sent a memo to all principals within the district
concerning the inclusion of prayer at the graduation ceremony. Id. The memo stated that
the student secret vote determined whether to include invocations and benedictions in
their graduation ceremony. Id. If the students agreed to include prayers, the students
would then decide whether a minister or a student would deliver the prayer at the gradua-
tion. Id. If the students chose a minister, then the students would decide which minister
will participate in the ceremony. Id. If the students, however, wanted fellow students to
deliver the prayer, then the third and fourth ranked students would deliver the prayer. Id.
52 Id. at 453.
53 Id. at 454.
54 See id. at 454 (stating that even though seniors had authority to decide if graduation
prayer was to be included in graduation ceremony, senior did not have exclusive control
over ceremony in that school officials "retain a high degree of control over contents of pro-
gram") ; see also Drimmer, supra note 1, at 432 (arguing that although students had power
to vote to include prayer at graduation, school officials still controlled event).
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concerning the inclusion of prayers at graduation was within the
hands of the students, this decision power was facilitated by
school officials.55 Consequently, the court found no difference be-
tween the school's official duty and school officials delegating their
responsibility to a non-governmental entity.56
For additional authority, the Harris court relied on Lee's psy-
chological coercion test to conclude that student sponsored
prayers are unconstitutional.5 7 The court asserted that the obliga-
tory nature of the ceremony coupled with the presence of state in-
volvement resulted in the students being unduly coerced into par-
ticipating in the prayers or remain respectfully silent.5"
The Harris court also found that student graduation prayers are
unconstitutional under the Lemon test, finding that no secular
purpose was furthered by including prayers at a graduation cere-
mony.59 The court reasoned that the primary effect of the inclu-
sion of prayers in the ceremony was the advancement of religion.6 °
In Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch.,61 the board of trustees of a
local school district passed a resolution which provided that the
use of prayer at graduation would be at the discretion of seniors
and that the prayer would be delivered by a student volunteer.6 2
The Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the student spon-
sored prayers. 3 This court held that prayers at graduation were
not psychologically coercive to the students.64 In addition, the
court held that student sponsored prayers satisfied the Lemon
55 See Harris, 41 F.3d at 454.
56 See id. at 455; see also Oliss, supra note 10, at 737 (contending that school officials in
Harris did not "cleanse themselves of their decision making duties and responsibilities" by
delegating authority to students to decide content of graduation ceremony).
57 See Harris, 41 F.3d at 456; see also Oliss, supra note 10, at 738 (discussing Harris
court's application of Lee's psychological coercion test in concluding that students at gradu-
ation ceremony will feel pressure to participate in religious expression).
58 See Harris, 41 F.3d at 456; see also Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 299 (detailing Harris
court's use of psychological coercion test that led to decision that student sponsored prayer
at graduation was unconstitutional because it placed undue pressure on objecting students
to conform with majority of students).
59 Harris, 41 F.3d at 457.
60 Id.
61 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
62 See id. at 964-65. The students had a choice of whether to include prayers in the grad-
uation ceremony. Id. If the students voted to include prayers, then it was also within the
students' power to determine which student volunteer would deliver the prayers at the
ceremony. Id. The students will also determine the content of the prayers. Id.
63 See Jones, 977 F.2d at 963. This case was appealed from a district court holding that
these student sponsored prayers were constitutional. Id.
64 See id. at 972.
1996]
284 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:273
test.6 5 It found that the primary effect of the prayers was secular
and the prayers did not result in governmental endorsement or
excessive entanglement with religion.66
The result of the Supreme Court's limitation of Lee was that the
lower courts are split on the issue of student sponsored graduation
prayers. It is asserted that the Supreme Court should resolve this
split by declaring student sponsored graduation prayers constitu-
tional based on the principles and purposes of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
III. THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE RENDER STUDENT SPONSORED
GRADUATION PRAYERS CONSTITUTIONAL
The Establishment Clause should not be construed as a limita-
tion on the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause.67 The
Supreme Court, in Capitol Square Review v. Pinette,68 announced
that the courts in Black Horse Pike and Harris failed to adhere to
this principle.69 It is submitted that if these courts abided by these
principles, the student sponsored prayers would have been upheld
as constitutional. In addition, according to Jones, student spon-
sored graduation prayers are able to pass both Lee's psychological
coercion test and the Lemon test.
r5 See id. at 966-972; see also Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 294-95 (stating that Jones
court held that student sponsored prayers satisfied all three prongs of Lemon test).
66 See Jones, 977 F.2d at 966-972.
67 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2440 (1995)
(stating that Establishment Clause forbids some forms of religious speech, but there are
other forms of protection for certain forms of religious speech); see also Marion K. McDon-
ald, Note, Establishment Clause Challenge to Mandatory Religious Accommodation in the
Workplace, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 121, 132 (1984) (analyzing difference between Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses); Debra Minker, Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment-State University's Policy of Equal Access to Campus Facilities for all Organiza-
tions Including Those of a Religious Character Does Not Violate the Establishment of Reli-
gion Clause of the First Amendment. Windmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), 32 EMORY
L.J. 319, 345 (1983) (discussing additional protection provided by Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses).
68 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
69 See id. at 2440; see also Swanson, supra note 6, at 1434-35 (explaining that analysis of
Establishment Clause by Court is less than crystal clear, but neutrality application in Pi-
nette was not applicable in Harris because there was only one option for ceremony's outside
speaker).
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A. Rulings in Harris and Black Horse Pike are Inconsistent
with the Latest Pronouncement of the Principles and
Purposes of Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court, in Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, ex-
pounded the most recent pronouncement of the principles and
purposes behind the Establishment Clause. v0 Capitol Square in-
volved the availability of a ten acre state owned plaza for public
speeches, gatherings and festivals v' as well as unattended dis-
plays.7 2 A permit was needed and several criteria had to be met in
order to use this plaza.7 3 The Ku Klux Klan requested permission
to place a cross on the square and the board denied the applica-
tion.7 4 The Sixth Circuit held that the Ku Klux Klan may place
their cross on Capitol Square because the cross is a religious ex-
pression that is purely private and is placed in a traditional or
designated public forum. 5
1. Capitol Square Review and the Importance of Free Speech
in the Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court, upon review of this case, held that private
religious speech, as well as secular private speech, was fully pro-
tected under the Free Speech Clause.76 The Court discussed the
significant difference between private speech utilized to endorse
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses pro-
tect, and government speech utilized to endorse religion, which
the Establishment Clause prohibits.77 The Court stated that the
70 See id. at 2444 (discussing Court's refinement of Establishment Clause principles as
needing governmental endorsement amounting to governmental speech in order to violate
Establishment Clause).
71 See id. at 2444.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 2450. The Ku Klux Klan filed suit seeking an injunction ordering the Board
to issue the application. Id. at 2445. The district court issued the injunction because the
Board failed to show that the cross could reasonably be construed as the state's endorse-
ment of Christianity. Id. As a result, the Ku Klux Klan was permitted to erect the cross. Id.
76 Id. at 2446. See generally Suzanne M. Fay, Case Note, Capital Square Review and
Advisory Bd. v. Vincent J. Pinette, Donnie A. Carr and Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 22
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 917, 917-19 (1996) (noting that Capitol Review held that private reli-
gious speech is protected under Free Speech Clause and thus is not violative of Establish-
ment Clause).
77 See Capitol Square Review, 115 S. Ct. at 2448 (stating that there is difference between
government endorsement of religion and private endorsement of religion); see also Board of
Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (stating that
crucial difference exists between speech Establishment Clause prohibits and speech Free
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Establishment Clause only applies to the words and conduct of the
government.78 The Court reasoned that the Establishment Clause
was never intended to exist as a restriction on purely private reli-
gious speech, whose only connection to the State is its communica-
tion in a public forum.v9
2. Black Horse Pike and Harris Do Not Conform with
Establishment Clause Principles and Purposes
It seems that when the principles promulgated in Capitol
Square Review are applied to the cases of Black Horse Pike and
Harris, the student sponsored prayers would be constitutional.
The prayers at issue in those cases were private speech because
they were chosen and delivered by the students and not by the
school officials or any other arm of the government.80 The only
link to a government actor was that the prayers were included in a
ceremony sponsored by state officials. 8 ' The issue then becomes
whether one should perceive the act of the students to be an act of
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses protect); Bryant W. Bishop, Protecting Private Religious
Speech in the Public Forum: Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct.
2440 (1995), 19 HAiv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 602, 605-06 (1996) (explaining Justice Scalia's
reasoning and proposition of bright line rule where "religious expression cannot violate the
Establishment Clause where it is (1) purely private (2) occurs in a ... public forum" but
this distinction between private religious speech and governmental religious speech, be-
comes blurred once private speech is mistaken for governmental speech); Richard E. Levy,
Dueling Values: Balancing Competing Constitutional Interests in Pinette, 5 KAN. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 43, 43-45 (1996) (asserting that distinction remains clear when government has
not fostered or encouraged mistaken perception of governmental endorsement of religion);
Jay A. Sekulow & John Tuskey, The "Center" is in the Eye of the Beholder, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 945, 947-48 (1996) (contending that this endorsement standard has been used only
when practice at issue was expressed by government, or when governmental action alleg-
edly discriminated in favor of private religious activity).
78 See Capitol Square Review, 115 S. Ct. at 2449; see also Keith A. Wilson, Note, Thou
Shalt Fund My Religious Expression: Neutrality Alone Gores the Establishment Clause in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 817,
828 (1996) (noting endorsement test applied only when government spoke or encouraged
others to speak on its behalf).
79 Capitol Square Review, 115 S. Ct. at 2449. See John F. Joiner, Note, A Page of History
or a Volume of Logic? Reassessing the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurispru-
dence, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 507, 569 (1996) (describing broad level of religious freedom and
sanctity of church as rationale underlying Establishment Clause).
80 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd., 84 F.3d 1471, 1474-
75 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that policy permitted students, not school officials, to include
prayer in graduation ceremony); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1994)
(permitting students to vote as to whether to include prayer at graduation ceremony); see
also Fay, supra note 78, at 929 (advancing Pinette's per se rule for Establishment Clause
cases, while noting issue of "religious expression" remains unresolved).
81 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1490 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (noting that no
decisions concerning graduation prayers were attributable to the state); Harris, 41 F.3d at
460 (Wright, J., concurring/dissenting) (discussing that state officials control every aspect
of graduation except for inclusion of prayer).
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the government.8 2 Understandably, a reasonable person might
perceive the prayers as governmental action or speech, since they
were delivered in a governmental forum.8 3
The Court in Capitol Square Review stated, however, that the
distinction between private speech and government speech will re-
main in tact if the government had not fostered or encouraged the
misconception that private speech is religious speech.8 4 The re-
spective boards in Black Horse Pike and Harris left the decision of
whether or not to include a prayer to the students, and the Board
did not control or influence the vote."5 It would thus follow that a
prayer, delivered on state property in a state ceremony, would not
render the prayer a governmental endorsement of religion.
8 6
It is asserted that the rights of the objecting students cannot
prevent the inclusion of graduation prayers simply because these
students do not want to participate. The very purpose of the Es-
tablishment Clause was to protect the people from governmental
impositions of religion." This amendment reflected the intent of
82 See Capitol Square Review, 115 S. Ct. at 2444 (discussing application of endorsement
test and noting that religious expression must be attributable to government); see also La-
mar C. Backer, The Incarnate Word, That Old Rugged Cross and the State: On the Supreme
Court's October 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Ab-
surdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA L.J. 447, 466 (1996) (analogizing Pinette and Rosenber-
ger decisions in that both established that "intentional manipulation" constituted govern-
mental involvement and that mere encouragement was insufficient).
83 See Capitol Square Review, 115 S. Ct. at 2449 (asserting that one could conceive of
case where government manipulates public forum to create impression of governmental
endorsement of religion); see also Gregory A. Napolitano, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment-Establishment Clause-Symbolic Expression, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 1209, 1217
(1996) (explaining rationale of Engel v. Vitale, where Court found indirect governmental
action could violate Establishment Clause).
84 See Capitol Review, 115 S. Ct. at 2448.
85 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1474-75 (stating that school policy allowed students
to decide whether to include prayers in graduation ceremony); Harris, 41 F.3d at 452-53
(noting that students by majority rule decided prayer content of ceremony without interfer-
ence from school officials).
86 See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches USFD, 508 U.S. 384, 385 (1993) (explaining
that occurrence of event on government property does not prove government endorsement);
see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (stating that there cannot be content-
based restrictions of religious speech, as that would be violative of First Amendment). See
generally Capitol Square Review, 115 S. Ct. at 2446-47 (citing Lamb's Chapel in that even
though school property was not public forum during off school hours, student's right to use
school facilities for religious program should be permitted).
87 See Everson v. Board. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947) (asserting that reasons settlers
came to America was to avoid religious conflicts in England); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 589 (1992) (asserting that Framers believed religious expression was too personal to
be prescribed by government); Serra, supra note 2, at 769 (establishing that early Ameri-
can settlers came to America to avoid church-state conflicts in England).
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the Framers to prevent the tyranny of religious persecution.8, The
Framers, however, could not have intended to protect a graduat-
ing student from the risk of coercion and imposition of religion
created by a fellow student's delivery of a graduation prayer.8 9
Student sponsored prayers are therefore constitutional because
the Establishment Clause is no more important than the graduat-
ing students' free speech and free exercise right to include prayer
in the ceremony. 90
B. Student Sponsored Graduation Prayers Do Not Pose Risk of
Coercion to Graduating Students
Both the Black Horse Pike and the Harris decisions rely on a
finding that student sponsored graduation prayers do not pass the
psychological coercion test.91 In Jones, however, the court found
88 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-9 (contending that First Amendment religious clauses are
embodiment of Framers fear of religious persecution); Joiner, supra note 81, at 511 (dis-
cussing court's propensity to rely on church and state jurisprudence of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison); see also Jimmy Daniels, Special Student Contribution, The First
Amendment: Has the Supreme Court Overlooked its Role as Guardian of our Freedom by
Failing to Distinguish Between Real Threat and Mere Shadow?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1167,
1175 (1995) (raising similar question: "[U1s graduation prayer the type of establishment of
religion the Framers of our Constitution intended to deter?").
89 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that it was impossible
that Framers of Constitution intended Establishment Clause to prohibit prayer at gradua-
tion, as such tradition is too long-standing); see also Allan Gordus, Case Note, The Estab-
lishment Clause and Prayers in Public High School Graduation: Jones v. Clear Creek In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 47 ARm L. REV. 653, 664 (1994) (stating that there was no way to determine
if Framers intended Establishment Clause to apply to public school graduation ceremonies,
as no public schools existed then); Marilyn Perrin, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Unanswered
Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 248 (1993) (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weis-
man, in particular discussion about Framers not intending Establishment Clause to pro-
hibit prayer at graduation ceremonies).
90 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (stating that no hierarchy of First
Amendment rights can be made because those rights are inseparable); Valley Forge College
v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (stating that there is no "principled basis" by
which we can create hierarchy among constitutional rights); Daniel Gordon, Re-establish-
ment of Religious Freedom: Developing An Alternative Model Based on State Constitutional
Privacy, 66 Miss. L.J. 127, 127-28 (1996) (asserting that both clauses must be read in har-
mony because if one clause is allowed to dominate, consequently, other clause will be ren-
dered worthless); Thomas R. McCoy & Gary A. Kurtz, A Unifying Theory: The Religion
Clause of the First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 255 (1986) (contending that religion
clauses should be read as "single conceptual unit"); Steve Gey, Note, Rebuilding the Wall:
The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1463, 1485 (1981) (stating that framers intended both religion clauses to be read as
unitary, correlative and co-extensive ideas that represent only different facets of some fun-
damental freedom-religious freedom).
91 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'I Bd., 84 F.3d 1471, 1480
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that since presence at graduation is practically compelled, risk of
student coercion is very high); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that because graduation is deemed obligatory event, students would be forced to
participate in prayer portion of ceremony).
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that student composed, sponsored and delivered prayers are not
psychologically coercive and are constitutional. 92
The psychological test, formulated in Lee, asks whether the gov-
ernment has directed formal religious practice or exercise in such
a manner that carries a particular risk of coercing objectors to
participate. 93 The absence of governmental interference in the in-
clusion of prayers in Harris and Black Horse Pike is similar to the
facts in the Jones case and not Lee; therefore, the prayers should
be deemed constitutional.94 According to Lee, for psychological co-
ercion to exist, there must have been governmental direction over
formal religious exercise and coercion, where objecting students
feel obliged to participate.9 5
Although the Lee Court could have prohibited all forms of grad-
uation prayers, it refrained from doing so by limiting the holding
to the facts of the case.96 As in Jones, the school officials' direction
in both Harris and Black Horse Pike were not of the same degree
as the school official's invitation to a rabbi to deliver a prayer in
Lee. 97 The boards in all three cases did not "direct the perform-
ance of formal religious exercise" because there would have been
no religious exercise if not for the student vote of approval.98 The
92 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Schs., 977 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
this situation meets Lee's psychological test in that these prayers are included by will of
fellow students, who are less able to coerce their fellow students).
93 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
94 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1492 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (noting that in Lee,
school official unilaterally decided to include prayers in ceremony, while in present case
students decided to include prayers); Harris, 41 F.3d at 452-53 (stating that ultimate deci-
sion of prayer inclusion was with students).
95 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587-94. See generally Broyles, supra note 2, at 280-283 (noting
degree of governmental control that must exist to amount to psychological coercion); Drim-
mer, supra note 1, at 428 (stating there must be some governmental direction over exercise
of religion in order to have psychological coercion stated in Lee).
96 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586 (stating that holding is limited to facts of case: school princi-
pal deciding to include prayer in graduation ceremony, inviting rabbi to deliver prayer,
limiting rabbi's prayer to nonsectarian prayers); see also Schimmel, supra note 5, at 928-29
(commenting on fact specific nature of Lee decision and therefore may not be binding on
cases involving student sponsored prayers); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 979-80 (noting that
Lee decision is confined to its facts, whereby graduation prayers that are not subject to
governmental or school control may be constitutional).
97 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1479 (contending that state's involvement in this
case is not of same degree as in Lee); Harris, 41 F.3d at 452 (stating that school officials had
no part in student vote); see also Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 291 (discussing cases dealing
with prayer at high school graduations).
98 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1474-1475 (explaining that school officials had no
control or influence over students' vote); Harris, 41 F.3d at 453 (noting Board's disclaimer
that statements made by anyone at graduation was not supported by Board); Jones v. Clear
Creek Indep. Schs., 977 F.2d 963, 964-965 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating Board's policy that inclu-
sion of benediction or invocation was within full discretion of students); see also Robert M.
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students controlled the direction of the formal religious exercise
since they made the decision to have a prayer.99
Moreover, it is asserted the participation element of the psycho-
logical coercion test is not satisfied in either Black Horse Pike or
Harris. The participation element in Lee was that government
mandated prayers at graduation ceremonies, placing unnecessary
psychological coercion on the graduating student to participate in
the religious observances.' 00 The Black Horse Pike and Harris
courts, however, utilize faulty reasoning because, as the Jones
court asserted, the presumption that graduating high school stu-
dents do not possess the requisite maturity necessary to avoid co-
ercion and indoctrination is erroneous. 1 1 It is hypocritical that
the law places great responsibilities on high school students, °2
while still not considering them mature enough to resist coercion
from a prayer delivered by their fellow students. 10 3 The gradua-
O'Neil, Who Says You Can't Pray?, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 347, 356-57 (1996) (discussing
how school officials have control over graduation exercises).
99 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1490 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (stating that none of
decisions made by graduating students to include prayer in their graduation is attributable
to state officials); Harris, 41 F.3d at 452-53 (reiterating school policy where majority of
graduating students' vote decides inclusion of prayers in graduation ceremony); see also
Jones, 977 F.3d 963, 971 (distinguishing between Lee facts and facts in Jones where court
held that Clear Creek district "exercises significantly less control over the content of invo-
cations" since it was students decision to include prayer in ceremony).
100 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587-594; see also Broyles, supra note 3, at 280-83 (explaining psycho-
logical coercion test developed in Lee); Rankin & Strope, supra note 6, at 1053-54 (discuss-
ing psychological coercion test); Schimmel, supra note 6, at 914-17 (analyzing psychological
coercion test).
101 See Jones, 977 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1992) (asserting graduating seniors are less
impressionable than younger students because they are aware that "prayers represent the
will of their peers, who are less able to coerce participation than any authority figure from
state or clergy"); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that many
graduating seniors are old enough to vote); Black Pike Horse, 84 F.3d at 1492 (Mansmann,
J., dissenting) (stating students have right to vote). But see Lee, 505 U.S. at 578 (stating
that school's official sponsorship of prayers results in indirect peer pressure on students to
participate because adolescents are often susceptible to pressure); O'Neil, supra note 104,
at 350 (noting that even if given opportunity to be excused, students will feel peer pressure
to participate). See generally Zirkel, supra note 8, at 1065-66 (discussing adolescent suscep-
tibility to peer pressure).
102 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 112 (1970) (sustaining Congress' setting
minimum voting age at 18).
103 See Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning that secondary school students are mature
enough and likely to understand school does not endorse student speech); Black Horse Pike,
84 F.3d at 1482 (recognizing that Lee Court was not convinced of maturity level of high
school students to be able to avoid compromising their religious beliefs); Harris, 41 F.3d at
457 (implying that high school students are immature because they are easily coerced by
peer pressure); see also James E. Wood, Jr., Religion and the Public Schools, 1986 BYU L.
REV. 349, 368 (1986) (discussing presumed maturity of high school students); Timothy M.
Gibbons, Note, The Equal Access Act and Mergens: Balancing the Religion Clauses in Pub-
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tion ceremony is not only a recognition for academic achievement,
but also marks a students' passage into adulthood. 104 With this
recognition, these students are given the responsibility of making
their own decisions.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee states that graduation prayers
are constitutional because the inclusion of prayers in graduation
ceremonies are a long standing tradition.105 This is consistent
with the tradition of including Judeo-Christian symbols within
America's most important institutions. 0 6 Our nation's currency,
for example, is inscribed with the phrase "In God we Trust"10 7 and
our pledge of allegiance describes this nation as "one nation,
under God."' 08
If the tradition of the inclusion of prayers at graduation is re-
stricted, these other religious traditions and symbols must also be
lic Schools, 24 GA. L. REv. 1141, 1162-1163 (1990) (citing Senate Judiciary Committee's
criticism of underestimation of high school students' maturity).
104 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (regarding graduation as transition
from adolescence to young adulthood); see also Yvone Barlow, Anti-DWI Groups Warn of
Risks When Teens Try to Mix Alcohol with Proms, Graduation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 16, 1996, at A21 (noting that leaving high school is passage into adulthood); Sara
Oppenheim, Graduation Brings Mixed Emotions, BALTIMORE SUN, May 23, 1995, at B1
(stating that graduating seniors make passage from adolescence to adulthood); Kristi
Wright, Growing Pains-A Quiz for the Adult-Impaired, OMAHA WoRLD-HI-RLD, June 11,
1996, at 29 (arguing that passage from childhood to adulthood occurs officially at age 18).
105 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating graduation prayers are exam-
ples of long-standing American tradition on nonsectarian prayer in public ceremonies); see
also Weinhaus, supra note 5, at 957 (describing invocation and benediction inclusion in
graduation ceremonies as long standing tradition); Lisha Gayle, Prayer Ban is Obeyed, Re-
luctantly, ST. LOUIS POST- DISPATCH, June 29, 1994, at 1, (asserting graduation prayers as
long-standing tradition); Susan Hill, Prayer Ruling Gets Low Marks, HERALD-ROcK HILL,
S.C., June 26, 1992, at 3A (calling graduation prayer long-standing tradition common in
local high schools).
106 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632-637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (detailing tradition of nation's
practice of including prayers of thanksgiving in public ceremonies); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (describing Americans as "religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being"). See generally 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1997) (describing our motto as "In
God We Trust"); 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1997) (stating our Pledge of Allegiance describes our na-
tion as "one nation, under God"); Vile, supra note 4, at 1051 (describing Americans as reli-
gious people); Serra, supra note 2, at 769 (describing phenomenon of "American civil
religion").
107 See 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1997) (declaring our national motto); see also Thomas R. McCoy,
A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1995) (pointing out that our currency carries motto "In God We Trust");
Malla Pollack, Prayer in Public Schools: Without Heat, How Can There Be Light, 15 Q.L.R.
163, 188 (1995) (pointing out that "In God We Trust" was added to all paper money, coins
and our national motto).
108 See 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1997) (designating out pledge of allegiance); see also Laura Un-
derkuppler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 837, 869 (1995) (pointing out that Pledge of Allegiance has religious references in
words "One Nation Under God"); Joseph R. Weisberger, E. Plurbus Unum the American
Miracle, 34 No. 4. JUDGES' J. 30, 31 (1995) (noting that "One Nation Under God" is how
founding Fathers wished for this country to remain).
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restricted. 10 9 These symbols can be reasonably viewed as the
State's endorsement and approval of a Judeo-Christian God. 110 If
a prayer at graduation can offend students, then it would follow,
under the Harris and Black Horse Pike rationale, that any of these
symbols could run the risk of indoctrinating these students."'
C. Student Sponsored Graduation Prayers Do Not Violate the
Lemon Test
An analysis of the psychological coercion test must be tempered
by the fact that only two of the five justices concurring in Lee used
and recognized this test." 2 The primary test used by courts is the
Lemon test."
13
The first prong of the Lemon test, that the questioned practice
serve a clear secular purpose, is satisfied when the rationale of
109 See generally Lee, 505 U.S. at 632-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that gradua-
tion prayers must be dealt with in same manner as other religious traditions in this coun-
try); Deborah K. Hepler, Feature, The Constitutional Challenge to American Civil Religion,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 110 (1996) (contending that in Lee, school district argued that
graduation prayers are no different from other religions proclamations).
110 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (utilizing examples of Judeo-Chris-
tian symbols incorporated in nation's traditions to demonstrate America's Judeo-Christian
tradition). See generally Vile, supra note 4, at 1051 (describing America as religious
country).
111 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that various American
symbols and practices that are founded in Judeo-Christian tradition and graduation
prayers must be dealt with equally).
112 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 603-605 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing view that "gov-
ernment concern of religious conformity" is not necessary element of Establishment Clause
violations); see also Lee, 505 U.S. 618-29 (Souter, J., concurring) (declining to adopt coer-
cion as required component of Establishment Clause violation as it undermines long-stand-
ing recognized Establishment Clause values); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Schs., 41 F.3d
447, 447 (1992) (utilizing Lemon test as well as coercion test); Schimmel, supra note 5, at
928 (stating Lee neither overruled nor endorsed Lemon test); Weinhaus, supra note 5, at
969-70 (stating that all five majority justices in Lee did not utilize same reasoning); Zirkel,
supra note 8, at 1064-65 (asserting coercion test is attributed only to plurality of court).
113 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971). The three prongs of the
Lemon test are: (i) the practice must serve a clear secular purpose; (ii) the practice must
have the primary effect that neither inhibits or advances religion; and (iii) the practice
must not have any excessive entanglement with religion. Id.; see also Keiner, supra note
21, at 415. It is asserted that Establishment Clause cases must still continue to utilize
Lemon test. Id. See e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd., 84
F.3d 1471, 1483-88 (3d Cir. 1996). The Lemon test should be used with the psychological
coercion test to evaluate the issue of the constitutionality of student sponsored prayers. Id.;
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 451-52 (9th Cir. 1994). Utilizing the Lemon test in
addition to Lee's psychological test, the court determined that the student sponsored
prayers were unconstitutional. Id.; Jones, 977 F.2d at 964-68. This case discusses the con-
stitutionality of student sponsored prayers in light of both the Lemon test and the psycho-
logical coercion test. Id.; Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 294-95. The Jones court utilized the
Lemon test as well as the coercion test. Id.
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Jones is applied." 4 The Jones court held that student prayer
served the secular purpose of solemnizing a very important mo-
ment in the lives of the students. 115
The second prong is that the practice must not have a primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion."16 The prayers were used
to neither advance nor inhibit religion because the inclusion of
prayer does not imply that the state has favored religious speech
over secular speech. 1 7 Here, the decision to include prayer was
not attributable to the state."l 8
The final prong of the Lemon test is that the practice in question
must avoid any excessive governmental entanglements with reli-
gion. 1 9 This final prong is also satisfied because a student's right
to decide whether to include prayer refutes any excessive entan-
glement of government and religion. 120
114 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1474-75 (involving policy whereby students' major-
ity vote will decide whether prayers will be included in graduation ceremony); Harris v.
Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 459 (9th Cir. 1994) (concerning district policy where students
will decide graduation prayers without any interference from school officials).
115 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1495 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (asserting policy
serves valid secular purpose of solemnizing graduation); Harris, 41 F.3d at 461 (Wright, J.,
dissenting) (stating that invocations and benedictions serve secular purpose of solemnizing
public occasions); Jones, 977 F.2d at 966-67 (contending that prayers solemnize public cere-
monies passes secular purpose prong of Lemon test); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that legitimate secular purposes of sol-
emnizing public occasions were not government approved); Tanford v. Brand, 932 F. Supp.
1139, 1145 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating first prong of Lemon is satisfied because invocation and
benediction served legitimate secular purpose of solemnizing public ceremony and continu-
ing long university tradition).
116 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613.
117 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1485 (stating that it cannot communicate message
that government approves or disapproves of religious exercise); see also Swanson, supra
note 6, at 1412 (noting that student participating in graduation ceremony that includes
invocation delivered by another student would understand that such religious beliefs are
solely those of speaking student).
118 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd., 84 F.3d 1471, 1493
(1996) (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (reasoning that student vote to include prayer is not
attributable to state or school officials); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 460 (9th Cir.
1994) (Wright, J., dissenting) (noting that school officials' disclaimer evinces fact that stu-
dents' decision to include prayer was not attributable to school or governmental officials).
119 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
120 See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1496-97 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (discussing fact
that policy created total absence of governmental entanglement with religious content of
graduation); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Schs., 977 F.2d 963, 969-70 (5th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that public school's use of graduation prayers can only violate Establishment Clause if
school officials monitored selection of speaker and prayer content); McCarthy, supra note 2,
at 486 (pointing out that several courts have upheld student-led and initiated graduation
prayers as constitutional under Establishment Clause).
294 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
CONCLUSION
Black Horse Pike and Harris were incorrectly decided because
student sponsored graduation prayers do not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. The courts' opposition to graduation prayers is
arbitrary and capricious as evinced by the courts' failure to settle
on one test to determine Establishment Clause violations. Fur-
thermore, courts have engaged in hypercritical interpretation by
holding some American religious practices to be constitutional,
while striking down student sponsored graduation prayers.
Student sponsored prayers pass the Lemon test, as proven by
the Jones decision. In addition, these prayers conform with the
principles and purposes of the Establishment Clause as fostered
in Capital Square Review. Furthermore, these prayers do not
pose any risk of being psychologically coercive to its audience
since such prayers are delivered by fellow graduating seniors and
not state actors.
It is time for the government to allow its citizens, especially its
future leaders, to encounter adverse ideas and information so that
they will be able to decide for themselves which ideas they wish to
adopt. The time has come for the Supreme Court to resolve the
issue of the constitutionality of student sponsored graduation
prayers and remedy the split among circuit courts.
Kimberly T. Morgan
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